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3d Marine Regiment
January 1967
During the month of January the basic mission of the
Third Marines remained unaltered even though the disposition of forces was realigned,
the forces available increased, and the area of operations expanded. As a
result of the realignment of forces with the attendant probability of
increased activity, the number of patrols in the Third Marines area of
operations was increased in order to gain intimate knowledge of the newly
occupied areas and to screen and cover the terrain between the outposts and
fixed installations and along the main routes of approach into the expanded
area of operations. At the close of January, after the relocated units had
become familiar with the area in and around their new positions, the
Regiment commenced a series of battalion (-) operations with the intent of
keeping one battalion on search and destroy missions, on an alternating
basis, at all times in order to keep enemy units from massing for an attack
on fixed positions.
At the end of December Third Marines forces and direct
support artillery were aligned in the following Manner. The Regimental
Headquarters was located at Camp J.J. CARROLL. Headquarters/E and H/2/3
were located in defensive positions at Camp CARROLL. Company F/2/3 was
located in defensive positions at the KHE GIA Bridge, and Company G/2/3 was
under the operational control of the 3/4. Headquarters, I, K, and M/3/3 were located in a “tight” defensive
position 2000-3000 meters north of THON SON LAM. L/3/3 was located in
defensive positions at the base of the “ROCKPILE”. Direct support
artillery was controlled by the 1/12 and essentially included two batteries
(Battery A and C) situated at Camp CARROLL. The total forces at the
disposal of the Third Marines were seven infantry companies and two
artillery batteries. The total area of operations of the Third Marines
comprised 79 square miles.
Just prior to the beginning of the new year the 3d Marine
Division and Division Forward were confronted with the task of
repositioning US Forces in the two northern provinces to relieve Vietnamese
Army units who were to redeploy in support of the Revolutionary Development
Program. Division Forward, in command of Operation PRAIRIE, was ordered to
relieve ARVN units at D-5, CA LU, and BA LONG Outposts, in addition to
maintaining forces in already occupied areas. The forces available to
Division Forward were three Marine infantry battalions and three Regimental
Forces Companies for positioning at the three outposts - D-5, CA LU and BA
LONG - to operate on a cooperation/coordination basis with the Marine units
to be located at those positions. The Third Marines recommended that
Regiment retain its two infantry battalions in their already assigned areas
and occupy the outposts at D-5, CA LU and BA LONG in addition. Together
with the Regional Forces Companies, Third Marines units would relieve the
ARVN forces at the three outposts. Furthermore,
the Regiment recommended that the primary position of the 3/3 be moved from
the “tight” defensive position to the north of THON SON LAM to an operating
base to the south of THON SON LAM astride Route 9 so that the battalion
could better maneuver within its own area of operations, while providing an
operating and/or reaction force for the entire PRAIRIE and KHE SANH area.
The plan was approved and repositioning commenced immediately. On
30 December 1966, K/3/3 and the 123d Regional Forces Company, moving by
truck convoy with supplies, began to relieve ARVN units at CA LU Outpost.
Relief was completed on 31 December 1966. As the 3/3 was unable to
physically support CA LU from positions north of THON SON LAM and the CAM
LO River and because of the great distance separating K/3/3 from its parent
organization with the attendant logistical support problems, the Third
Marines assumed operational control of K/3/3. Operational control K/3/3 and
responsibility for the CA LU area of operations was later given to 3/3
after it had displaced to new positions south of THON SON LAM. After the
displacement of troops to CA LU, supplies initially were helilifted in to
provide a ten day dump level for committed units. Initially operations at
the CA LU Outpost emphasized patrol activity to gain a detained knowledge
of the surrounding area.
On 31 December E/2/3 and the 122d Regional Forces
Company relieved ARVN forces at D-5 Outpost and took responsibility for
operations in the Cua Valley. Tactical and
logistic support for D-5 proved a far easier task than for CA LU. Support
could be moved either directly overland from Camp CARROLL or down Route 558
from CAM LO. It was necessary first, however, to open and repair Route 558
prior to the movement of troops to D-5. The road has continually required
engineer support to keep it open and trafficable. The logistic support of
D-5, as of CA LU was predicated on a buildup of supplies to support
operations in the event of an inability to resupply because of inclement
weather or other influencing conditions or events. Operations in the D-5
area, as at CA LU, commenced with patrol activity to get a “feel” for the
local area. Differing slightly from the units at CA LU, Company E had
previously operated in the D-5 area on an operation in conjunction with
ARVN units located there, thus aiding their activities during the initial
operations.
On 31 December 1966 G/2/3 returned to the operational
control of its parent organization from 3/4. G/2/3 was alerted for the move
to BA LONG. On 12 January 1967 after a prolonged period of inclement
weather, the advance party of Company G and supplies were lifted by
helicopter to BA LONG. On 13 January the remainder of the Company was lifted
in along with Battery W/1/13, which was to provide direct support artillery
for the area. Battery W was placed under the operational control of 1/12.
Because of the inability of 2/3 to support G/2/3 easily, the operational
control of the company passed to the Third Marines, with Major W.H. FORREY
assigned as Senior Officer Present (SOP) BA LONG, on 13 January. On the
same day responsibility for BA LONG area of operations was assumed even
though due to weather the ARVN units required an additional two weeks to
complete the movement of their supplies and troops form the area. In
addition, the same period of time was also required to complete the
movement of the 526th Regional Forces Company to BA LONG to
operate with the Marines in that area. As the BALONG Outpost is accessible
only by helicopter, the logistical buildup required most of the month to
attain the required ten day back log of supplies, due to the inability of
helicopters to fly during inclement weather. Operations at BA LONG, as at
the other two newly acquired outposts, involved an initial phase of heavy
patrol activity in order to gain detailed knowledge of the new area.
During the month of January E/2/3 and the 122d Regional
Forces Company conducted operations in the CUA Valley, in the vicinity of
D-5, directed toward the pacification of that area. In addition to normal
patrolling activities, several company sweeps and road clearing operations
were conducted. All activity was coordinated with the village chief and National
Police in the area through the Fifteenth Counterintelligence Sub-Team
working out of D-5. Frequent contact resulted throughout the month on a
small unit level. In addition to captured weapons and supplies, the enemy
casualty figures were: sixteen confirmed kills, seven probable kills, three
confirmed wounded one VC and two Civil Defendants captured, and numerous
civilians detained for interrogation.
In addition to tactical operations, a County Fair
(3-21) was conducted in the DOC KINH Refugee Hamlet near D-5, on 7 January.
After the area had been cordoned off E/2/3 and 122d Regional Forces
Company, the people were gathered at a centrally located collection point,
while their houses were searched. The people were then processed for proper
identification by Vietnamese officials. During the identification
screening, the Regimental Surgeon treated approximately 238 people for
physical ailments. The people were then gathered at a central point to hear
propaganda tapes by an Audio/Visual Team from the 244th
Psychological Operations Company (USA). Then speeches were given by a
rallier and the District Chief from CAM LO, stressing the themes of
hardship under VC leadership and prosperity under government leadership.
Also songs were sung by members of Vietnamese Information Service Team from
CAM LO. On the preceding day rice and cloth were distributed to each family
and during the County Fair clothing was distributed to the children by
District officials. In addition to the intelligence information which was
gathered, the most significant fact was that the County Fair was run almost
entirely by the local Vietnamese. The operation was well received by the
people, who have been encouraged by most of the Vietnamese government and
Marine activities and operations in the area.
Generally speaking, the people in the valley have become
more cooperative since Marines have moved into the area; however, a “wait
and see” attitude is still prevalent. The VC has experienced a great deal
of difficulty, on the other hand. As reported in a letter from a VC
political cadre member to his superiors, the VC are experiencing trouble
finding civilian support and supplies. The Marines in the area have made it
difficult for them to move and to hide supplies and weapons. In addition
their men are subjected to constant harassment and contact by supporting
arms fire and patrol activities. The VC has fallen into a state of
disarray, and the pacification of the area proceeds.
In addition to the Civil Affairs Program in the CUA
Valley a program was recently begun at the CAM LO District Dispensary by
the Regimental Surgeon. Although the facilities are good, there is a
shortage of trained personnel. Third Marines medical personnel have
undertaken a treatment and training program in the area, and for the month
of January, 114 people have been treated. The training of personnel to take
over from the Marines has not as yet passed beyond the planning stages.
Self-help is also being provided to Montagnard refugees
from CAM LO. They are being given work to clear areas around Marine
installations and along main supply routes and are being paid in Bulgur
wheat and cooking oil by USAID. Not only will this work enable the
Montagnard refugees to become more self-supporting, but it also aids in
strengthening the defenses of Marine installations and in making road
traffic safer due to reduced ambush possibility.
Psychological Operations, in addition to those in
support of the County Fair, were predicated on two points of emphasis.
First, leaflets directed at the NVA were distributed by hand on trails
throughout the Third Marines operating area. Secondly, newspapers were
passed out through the CAM LO District Headquarters to the people of the
area. These newspapers are published by the Vietnamese government and
JUSPAO in Saigon and present the government viewpoint toward the war effort
in an attempt to overcome the effects of VC propaganda. Increased efforts
in both fields will be made during the TET period in support of the TET
Psychological Operations Campaign.
Toward the end of January, after several sniping
incidents at vehicles moving along Route 9 and Route 558, Third Marines
activated a motorized counter-sniper patrol. Employing snipers from
Headquarters Company, the patrol covered the area along Route 9 between
Camp CARROLL and DONG HA and on Route 558 between CAM LO and D-5, keeping
the Regiment informed of its position at all times.
The alignment of the Third Marines infantry and direct
support artillery forces was now as follows: Third Marines - Headquarters
at Camp CARROLL, SOP BA LONG, Company G and 526th RF Company at
BA LONG Outpost; Headquarters and H/2/3 at Camp CARROLL, F/2/3 at the KHE
BIA Bridge, E/2/3 and 122d RF Company at D-5; Headquarters, I and M/3/3 at an operating base south of THON SON LAM, L/3/3 at the
base of the “ROCKPILE”, K/3/3 and 123d RF Company at CA LU; Headquarters,
Batteries B and C /1/12 at Camp CARROLL, Battery B 1/40 (USA) with 3/3
Battery W/1/13with SOP BA LONG at the BA LONG Outpost. The new alignment
represented an increase from seven infantry companies and two 105mm
batteries to eight infantry companies, three RF companies, three 105mm
batteries and one 4.2 inch battery. The area of operations was expanded
from 79 square miles to 217 square miles. The number of fixed installation
was increased from four (Camp CARROLL, KHE GIA Bridge, 3/3 primary
position, and “ROCKPILE”) to seven (Camp CARROLL, KHE GIA Bridge, D-5, BA
Long, new 3/3 primary position, ROCKPILE, and CA LU).
The weather at the beginning of January followed
patterns similar to December - cold and wet with poor visibility. The
northeast monsoon developed to its fullest extent. The entire month was
characterized by generally poor overall weather. The sun was visible from
Camp CARROLL on a total of four days. The other days, typical crachin
weather prevailed, i.e. drizzle, low visibility, and complete cloud cover
and 10-15 knot winds. The temperature ranged from 65 to 72 degrees F and
the average humidity was 88%. Total rainfall for the month of January was
5.9 inches. The weather adversely affected friendly operations. In some cases
the commencement date or the scheme of maneuver of an operation had to be
altered because of inclement weather or poor visibility. Aerial Photo
Recon, Medevac, resupply and patrol extraction missions were also adversely
affected. On the ground, high water levels in streams and rivers coupled
with soft muddy earth hindered the movement by foot and vehicles
Individual clothing, in particular, Jungle utilities,
and jungle boots were in short supply during most of the month, but the
situation is improving. Individual equipment, e.g. body armor, upper torso;
canteen cups and covers; and field mess knives, forks and spoons were
reported as short items in the OPCON battalions.
Enemy activity during the month of January consisted of
isolated, unrelated mortar attacks on friendly positions and small unit
actions. There were sixteen enemy
mortar attacks on friendly units in the PRAIRIE area, two on 3/3, with an
average of thirty five 82mm mortar rounds falling in each. There was a
sharp increase in the number of small unit contacts during the month,
particularly in CUA Valley. Mine and booby trap incidents also increased.
There was, however, no contact with, or even sightings of, major enemy
units by Third Marine forces. In addition, in every reported incident throughout
the area of operations, the enemy either broke contact upon making it, or
withdrew to avoid it.
The concept of
operations within the Third Marines area of operations had substantially
changed as a result of repositioning of forces, although the basic mission
had not. With additional forces, but an expanded area, the tactical
thinking had to change. 3/3 moved form a “tight” defensive position to an
operating base in order to permit large scale operations; however, the
primary impetus for action still evolved upon small units. Patrols were
employed both to gain knowledge of the newly acquired areas and to cover
and screen areas between fixed installations and along main routes of
approach into the area of operations. Company and platoon patrol bases augmented
local security to carry out these objectives, particularly to cover the
main threats to the THON SON LAM and Camp CARROLL areas. During the last
week of January battalion (-) sized operations were conducted, employing
first one and then the other battalion in the “field”. During this entire
period the improvement of defenses at fixed installations continued.
As a result of the greater number of fixed
installations and their wide dispersion, the logistic concept called for resupply
by surface means to as great an extent as possible. BA LONG is still
accessible only by helicopter and must be resupplied in that manner. CA LU
and D-5 are now accessible by road and are being resupplied by surface
means, though it was necessary to resupply CA LU by air initially. The
Third Battalions new position is also accessible by road and is resupplied
by convoy. A ford was opened across the CAM LO River so that Company L
could be resupplied in the same manner, provided the river was not swollen
by monsoon rains. Although shortages in certain items existed at times
during January, they were by the end of the month essentially rectified;
and stock levels were brought up to ten days of supply. Engineer efforts
during January were primarily in support of the logistic concept of
operations. Route 558 and Route 9 were opened to D-5 and CA LU
respectively, and continued efforts were directed toward keeping these
roads open and trafficable during the monsoon season.
Major operations conducted during the month of January
were as follows. Immediately upon the termination of New Year’s Truce on 2
January the Third Marines conducted extensive counter mortar exercises.
Counter mortar fire plans were plotted, and tested for speed of reaction
and accuracy. Fires were plotted on known and suspected enemy mortar sites.
Extensive H&I’s were fired, particularly during the predawn and predusk
periods, to offset enemy attacks. It had been noted that every enemy mortar
attack on Third Battalion, Third Marines Command post during the preceding
two months had occurred between the hours of 1700 and 1900, thus the
emphasis on the pre-dusk H&I’s . Patrolling activities were increased
during the counter mortar exercises and platoon patrol bases were
established.
Since the time when the QUANG TRI River Valley from CA
LU to BA LONG, or the BA Long Valley as it is sometimes known, was included
in the Third Marines area of operations, an operation had been planned in
that area. After the termination of the Second Battalion operation on 27
January the necessary forces were available
Plans for insertion of a two platoon patrol base on
DONG HA Mountain to the north of Camp CARROLL across the CAM LO River were
delayed, as inclement weather prevented both the helicopter insertion and
attempts to walk in across the swollen river, early in the month. On 13
January, the weather cleared enough to allow the lifting of one platoon
from H/2/3 onto the mountain. The platoon was maintained there by
helicopter resupply, being withdrawn on 24 January.
January marked the termination of PRAIRIE I, and
PRAIRIE II, commenced on 1 February. In the offing for February is the
displacement of the Regimental Headquarters to DONG HA in conjunction with
plans for the Third Marines to assume operational control of all the
infantry units in the PRAIRIE area upon the movement of the Fourth Marines
Command Post to PHU BAI area. The beginning of February will also mark the
commencement of the TET Season. Indications are that enemy activity before
and after the holidays will probably increase. The end of the monsoon
season appeared in sight during the last days of January as the overcast
broke for several days and the sun appeared. Two battalion-sized operations
were conducted at the end of the month in conjunction with the improved
weather conditions. This prospective change in the weather and the fact
that newly positioned units have become familiar with their areas will
certainly mark the beginning of an increase in the number and size of
operations after the TET holiday.
Final hostile casualties for the month of January were:
KIA 0, WIA 20, MIA 0. Total non-hostile casualties were 50
010001H-010700H
3d Marines operations
during the New Year Truce period were conducted using maximum recon patrols
and ambushes.
020900H-050900H
3d Marines conducted extensive counter mortar operations in AO to perfect
counter mortar reaction and fire plans to prevent enemy mortar attacks.
Extensive artillery H&I’s and fires on known and suspected mortar
positions were combined with aggressive patrolling activities within the
AO. Emphasis was placed upon predusk and predawn counter mortar fires.
041736H 3/3 (XD 982582) had an 81mm short round land in another gun
position resulting in 2 USMC WIA.
051600H K/2/3 patrol apprehended 3 VN females in
the vicinity of (YD 098512). Two of the females were married to known VC
and were detained. The detainees were transported to G-2 for further
interrogation. Results: 2 Civil Defendants.
07020215H-080920H
F/2/3 and RF 122 conducted
County Fair 3-21 in the DOC KINH Refugee Hamlet in the CUA Valley. 2200
people were processed by Vietnamese officials for proper identification.
238 people were treated by the Regimental Surgeon. Propaganda was
disseminated in the form of tapes, talks by a CHIEU HOI, and a speech by
the District Chief of CAM LO. The County Fair was well received by the
people, and additional intelligence information to assist in the
pacification of the CUA Valley was gathered.
8 Jan 67 An additional 3 Otters were employed by 3/3 in their AO.
This makes a total of 6 Otters which are employed in the 3d Marines AO.
These machines have been used by 3/3 exclusively during this period. The
deadline rate is about 70% when using the Otter in rough, rocky terrain,
but during the latter part of the month this was reduced to 20% when repair
parts were airlifted from DA NANG.
111613H 3/3 CP and M/3/3 CP fifty rounds of 82mm mortar fire fell
during a twenty minute period; however resulting damage was minimal. Results:
5 USMC WIA. Counter mortar fire was returned within two minutes on the
primary enemy mortar position in the vicinity of (XD 963582) as well as the
other suspected enemy positions. L/3/3 CP located at the base of the
“ROCKPILE”, and L/33 PPB (XD 967564)on the “RAZORBACK” were hit by small
arms fire from that ridgeline during the mortar attack; artillery was fired
in support of that company as well. All enemy fire was suppressed by 1635H,
and escape routes were fired upon by artillery. A total of 521 artillery
rounds were expended in counter mortar fire, H&I’s, and grid square
saturation, during and following the enemy mortar attack.
120900H-131215H
G/2/3, W/1/13 and 526th RF Company moved to BA LONG to relieve
ARVN units in the area for participation in the Revolutionary Development
Program, assumed responsibility for BA LONG AO, and chopped to 3d Marines.
121000H 3/3 began its movement to new positions to the south. In a
two stage displacement the Battalion moved from a “tight” defensive
position to the north of THON SON LAM and the CAM LO River to an operating
base to the south of THON SON LAM astride Route 9 vicinity of (XD 982544).
On the first day Command Group A, M and H&S/3/3 moved by foot across
the CAM LO River to the new position. Positions were set up in the in conjunction
with Battery B, 1/40 USA, tanks and ontos, thus allowing 3/3 to better
support units within its AO.
121110H H/2/3 patrol sweeping village (YD
115504) detonated booby trap resulting in 1 USMC WIA.
121223H 87 82mm mortar rounds of enemy mortar fire fell on positions
vacated by M/3/3 several hours before. Within six minutes artillery and
81mm counter mortar fire was delivered on six separate targets.
121230H The enemy fire ceased after a total of 160 artillery rounds
were fired in suppression. The enemy apparently had not noted 3/3’s
displacement which resulted in their firing on a vacated position.
These
two attacks differed noticeably from previous attacks in the time of
occurrence (prior to 1700), perhaps as a result of pre-dusk H&I’s. It
should also be noted that friendly casualties were minimal. The second
attack, which did not appear to have been premeditated, was completely
fruitless. The enemy did not even bother to observe his fires; otherwise it
might have been noted that the Company M position was deserted. The quick
response of counter mortar fire resulted in the termination of enemy fires
more quickly than on previous occasions, and damage was limited. An
analysis of these two attacks confirmed the value of previously conducted
counter mortar exercises.
13 Jan 67 Command Group B and I/3/3displaced by helicopter to the new
positions. The move was completed at 131750H.
130900H-241329H
H/2/3 platoon (Reinf)
maintained a PPB on DONG HA Mountain and conducted extensive reconnaissance
patrols in the area, thus denying the enemy a potential mortar position
against Camp CARROLL. This PPB was inserted, extracted and resupplied by
helicopter. The platoon was extracted to the originally planned time in
order to participate in another operation.
14 Jan 67 After a suitable defensive position had been established by
the 3/3, Battery B/1/40 (USA), with 105mm (SP) howitzers, displaced to the
new position to provide direct support artillery for 3/3. Battery B (USA)
was assigned to the operational control of the 1/12. Tanks, ontos, and dual
40mm guns (SP) were also moved to the new position.
Initially
the 3/3 had difficulty communicating with Regiment; however, wire was laid
to establish trunk lines between 3/3 and the Regimental Command Post.
Subsequently, this communications network was replaced by erecting a radio
relay link on the “ROCKPILE”. The new position of the Third Battalion,
astride Route 9, provided easy access for vehicular traffic. Previously the
Battalion had been cut off from vehicular access by the CAM LO River, which
necessitated helicopter resupply. Now the battalion could be resupplied by
truck convoy, and communication/coordination between commanders was made
less difficult. This new location permitted the establishment of a water
point with hot showers and the feeding of “A” rations. This battalion had
been without such luxuries for nearly three months.
15 Jan 66 Battery B (USA) displaced four guns from 3/3 position to a
point west in order to bring direct fore to bear on the western slopes of
the “RAZORBACK”, demonstrating the operational mobility of the Third
Battalion supporting arms. The battalion was now in position to support CA
LU with forces and its own direct support artillery.
16 Jan 67 3/3 assumed operational control of Company K and
responsibility for the CA LU area of operations. The battalion was also
prepared to commit a command group and up to two companies for operations
at any of the outposts in the Third Marines area of operations or anywhere
in the PRAIRIE/KHE SANH area.
21 Jan 67 F/2/3 passed to the operational control
of the 3/4 as the company moved to DONG HA for the defense of that area in
support of an operation elsewhere.
22 Jan 67 3/4 began an operation to the north and
east of DONG HA Mountain.
24 Jan 67 Division Forward decided to move the
operating area somewhat to the south, but still north and east of DONGHA
Mountain, and to place the operation under the control of the 2/3.
25 Jan 67 All elements of the 3/4 involved in the operation,
except for Company M, returned to DONG HA. Company F returned to the 2/3,
and Battery B1/12 moved from DONG HA to positions north of Camp CARROLL on
Route 9 to support the operation on the following day.
260758H 2/3 commenced the operation, as lead
elements were helilifted into an artillery prepped landing zone. Employing
M/3/4, which had remained in the area from its previous operation, as a
blocking force to the east, Command Group A and F and H/2/3 with M/3/3 attached, commenced a two
phase search and destroy operation beginning in an area north of DONG HA
Mountain and moving east. L/3/4 was moved to reinforce Camp CARROLL and
also came under the operational control of 2/3.
26 Jan 67 Two 175mm guns
from 2/94 USA displaced from Camp CARROLL to 3/3’s position south of THONN
SON LAM to fire in support of an engaged recon patrol. This was the first
nighttime displacement for these guns in Vietnam.
260630H I/3/3 patrol
received 1 incoming grenade at (XD 982528) resulting in 1 USMC WIA.
27 Jan 67 As a result of increased enemy activity
to the west in the vicinity of KHE SANH (Two recon patrols had been heavily
engaged in that area in less than a week), the operation was terminated and
all units concerned were directed to move to their respective Command Posts
and return to their parent units. Because of difficult terrain encountered
by the Second Battalion’s operating force, the unit’s required movement was
not completed until 0330H on 28 January.
In conjunction with the increased enemy activity to the west, the Third
Marine Regimental Command Group A and 3/3 were prepared for a possible move
to KHE SANH; however no requirement developed for employment of forces in
that area..
290200H Command Group A
and I/3/3 commenced movement to CA LU to link up with K/3/3 for the
proposed operation. Battery B, 1/40 (SP) (USA) followed in trace to provide
direct support artillery from CA LU.
290500H Command Group A,
I, K/3/3 and one platoon of the 123d Regional Forces Company from CA LU
commenced a sweep, at first light, of the populated area on the northern
side of the QUANG TRI River to the east of CA LU with G/2/3 in blocking
position further to the east in the river valley. Action terminated at
291625H and units commenced movement to their respective CP’s. Results of
operation were 2 enemy KIA (Conf), 1 PW (NVA), 7 PW (VC), and assorted
enemy weapons and supplies.
29 Jan 67 3 rubber boats
were received by 3/3 for use in crossing the CAM LO and QUANG TRI Rivers.
Qualified personnel were available in this unit to utilize these boats.
Prior to this time, local boats were used to cross swollen rivers and
streams.
301830H K/3/3 captured
another VC in the CA LU area. The captive stated he would lead the company
to a recently hidden arms cache.
300915H E/2/3 patrol tripped booby trapped M-26
grenade at YD 103503) resulting in 2 USMC WIA.
301805H L/3/3 PPB (XD
967564) received heavy fire from estimated 5 enemy automatic weapons
resulting in 9 USMC WIA.
31 Jan 67 K/3/3 (-) with a squad of RF’s, conducted another sweep of
the village area on the northern bank of the QUANG TRI River, with four
guns from Battery B, (SP) (USA) again displacing to CA LU. Although the
arms cache was not located, two additional VC were captured. The sweep
terminated at noon, with the units returning to their respective Command
Posts
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