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3d Marine Regiment
February 1967
At the beginning of February prospects for the month
indicated improved weather conditions, though continued low visibility with
the attendant effect upon helicopter support. Supply shortages were being alleviated,
and living conditions were expected to improve. Enemy activity, however,
could be expected to increase during the latter half of the month as a
result of better weather and the TET truce period which would allow enemy
forces the freedom to move troops and supplies relatively unhampered by GVN
- Free World interdiction. Though enemy efforts would be directed at the
disruption of the Revolutionary Development Program, as conducted by RVN
forces and GVN personnel, the possibility of increased contact between
Marines and enemy forces was not to be brushed lightly aside.
To combat the advantages offered the enemy by the TET
Truce period, the 3d Marines concept of operations for the month of
February was as follows: Prior to the advent of TET, aggressive local
patrolling to prevent reconnaissance of Marine outposts and installations
was to be conducted. Platoon and company sized patrol bases to prohibit
enemy movement and to deny access to vital areas were to be established. Battalion
sized operations, alternating one battalion with another in the field, to
exploit hard intelligence and actual enemy contacts were to be conducted,
and recon patrols were to be employed to cover the intervening areas
between operating forces. All efforts prior to TET were directed toward leaving
the enemy the least advantageous position possible at the advent of TET.
During TET, infantry and recon units were limited to intelligence gathering
efforts and the conduct of local security. Following TET, battalion sized
operations alternating one battalion with another in the field, would again
be resumed to exploit intelligence information obtained during TET, to keep
enemy forces off balance, and to disrupt plans for attacks on Marine units
and positions. Local patrols and patrol bases would again be used as
fighting forces as well as security efforts and intelligence gathering.
Artillery, except during TET, would be employed to fire H&I’s and grid
square saturation in addition to observed missions.
The supply concept for the month of February was
predicated on maintaining stocks at required levels at each of the outlying
Marine positions, so that operations could be conducted without fear of
shortages. Roads, whenever and wherever available, were to be utilized for
the movement of supplies in lieu of helicopters. Engineer efforts were to
be directed toward the opening of new roads and the maintenance of existing
ones. Communications support was to emphasize establishing primary and
alternate means of communications with subordinate, adjacent, and higher
headquarters and maintaining these communications lines. Administrative
functions were predicated on proper fulfillment of existing requirements
and on providing a high state of morale and discipline among the men.
The Civil Affairs concept for the month of February
envisioned a continuing coordination and strengthening of existing programs
from the preceding month. Through aid to the local population in the form
of providing work and medical assistance, confidence in the friendliness
toward Marine units was to be inspired in addition to raising local
standards of living moreover; a practice of meeting the people on a
personal basis was to be undertaken to encourage understanding between the
two cultures. Psychological Operations, in addition to attempts to
encourage the people to support the government, were to be directed at
convincing the enemy to surrender during the TET period to enjoy the
holidays with family and friends, to end senseless killing and hardships,
and to erase the probability of almost certain death while fighting the GVN
- Free World Forces. Hardships, home sickness, and the possibility of a
good life for returnees under the government of Vietnam were to be
exploited.
In response to intelligence reports that an enemy unit
of company size was operating to the east of the CUA Valley, during the
latter part of January, an operation was planned in that area to employ 2d
Bn, 3d Marines. M/3/3 was attached
to 2/3 to provide security for Camp CARROLL and at 010530H Command Group A
and Companies F and H, 2/3 commenced movement from the axis along Route 9
to a line of departure east of CAM LO. E/2/3 and the 122d RF Company
moved from the D-5 Outpost at 0700H to set up blocking positions to the
south of the axis of advance. At 0730H the attacking units cross the ID,
advancing south toward the CUA Valley. By
021200H, the first phase of the operation was completed, and H/2/3 returned
to Camp CARROLL to relieve M/3/3 which returned to its parent unit that
afternoon. The remainder of the battalion continued to operate in the
D-5 area, conducting local sweeps. After two sweeps of the MAJ DAM/MAJ LOC
area of the high ground to the south, F/2/3 and the command group returned
to Camp CARROLL and E/2/3/ and the RF’s to D-5, terminating the operation
at 031115H. Results of the operation were 2 enemy
KIA (conf) and several items of captured equipment. There were no friendly
casualties.
After the conclusion of the 2/3 operation, the 3d
Marines shifted to a heavy patrolling posture. Company and platoon size
patrol bases were established during the period of 3-7 February with forces
from each of the fixed installations and outpost in order to interdict
enemy movement, disrupt his resupply and propaganda efforts, and to prevent
the strengthening of his positions. Extensive psychological operations were
also conducted during this period in conjunction with the IIIMAF TET PsyWar
Campaign. During the TET Truce period itself, 3d Marines maintained a
maximum surveillance effort to detect enemy movement and resupply and
employed Division recon patrols in conjunction with this effort. Local
security continued with added diligence in readiness for possible enemy
truce violations.
Following the
TET period a two phase operation was planned in the western and
southwestern portion of the 3d Marines area of operations, in response to
intelligence reports of enemy activity and recon patrol contacts in that
area. The operation was to be conducted by 3/3, employing Company K and RF
Forces from CA LU to block to the south along Route 9 and a helibourne
battalion (-) to advance form the north during the first phase. The second
phase was to center round a series of helibourne encircling movements
involving the battalion (-) to the northwest of the Phase I operating area.
This operation was to be the first of several
operations following TET to keep enemy forces off balance and disrupt plans
for attacks on fixed installations and outposts. Also in conjunction with
the end of TET, 3d Marines conducted counter mortar drills and counter
mortar fire exercises at all fixed installations within the area of
operations for a three day period (12-14 Feb) to prevent enemy attacks as a
result of TET troop movements.
At 122310H
February K/3/3 (-) and a platoon from the 123d RF Company set out from CA
LU for their blocking positions and were in position by 130800H. At first
light on 13 February, C/1/12 displaced to CA LU to provide fire support for
the operation. Foul weather, however, prevented helilift of 3/3’s main
elements into the operating area, and the scheme of maneuver had to be
modified. K/3/3 (-) and the RF platoon were ordered to set up a patrol base
north of Route 9 at their planned blocking position and to reconnoiter in
force the area to the north and northwest. The helibourne portion of the
operation was cancelled until 16 February. On 16 February the patrol base
forces withdrew to CA LU. Poor visibility prevented the helilift, which was
rescheduled for the first opportunity that weather permitted. On the
afternoon of 17 February the weather cleared, and 3/3 (-) was lifted to the
operating area. Thoroughly covering the operating area, which had been
condensed somewhat due to time factors, the battalion located several enemy
base camps and harboring sites, discovering two complete 82mm mortars,
assorted ammunition, and explosives at one location. At 211440H February
3/3 returned to its permanent position and terminated the operation. In
addition to the weapons captured and the installations destroyed, the
operation resulted in 5 enemy KIA (conf) and 1 PW
(VC) captured.
The operation conducted by 3/3 was followed immediately
by another operation to reconnoiter in force the area between the D-5 and
BA LONG Outposts and to relieve the company at BA LONG. The operation to be
conducted by 2/3, was to have route 558 as its
axis of advance to the QUANG TRI River Valley and H/2/3 was to be employed.
Moving by foot from Camp CARROLL, H/2/3 commenced the
operation on 211115H February. Linking up with elements of G/2/3 on the
northern side of the QUANG TRI River, H2/3 moved to the BA LONG Outpost and
passed to the operational control of SOP BA LONG at 221700H. On the
following day G/2/3 returned to Camp CARROLL by helicopter, arriving at
231500H and chopping to 2/3.
At 240001H February BLT 2/3 was activated for the
purpose of administrative preparation of 2/3 and supporting units for
rotation to Okinawa during the first week of March. The battalion was to be
relieved by 3/9 returning from Okinawa. The last week of February was to be
used for 2/3’s preparation, the tactical situation permitting.
The “RAZORBACK”
with its rough terrain and numerous caves had always been a source of enemy
activity concentrated against the battalion occupying the western portion
of the 3d Marines area of operations. It was decided that the next
operation, employing 3/3, would be conducted in this area. The scheme of
maneuver was to include one company to block and one company to maneuver,
in alternating fashion, and an additional platoon to screen the operation
was to move along the eastern side of the ridgeline to the northern tip,
then swing back south along the western side. Commencing at 270400H
February, the blocking force moved into position with the maneuver company
and the battalion command group moving shortly thereafter. Fire support for
the operation was provided by B/1/40 (USA) which displaced west from
positions at THON SON LAM, so that the western slope of the “RAZORBACK”
could be adequately covered. Curing the course of the operation numerous
fighting holes, bunkers, and caves were located and destroyed, and several
items of equipment were discovered; otherwise there was no enemy contact.
As a result of enemy activity to the east in the CAM LO, the operation was
terminated earlier than had been scheduled. The battalion returned to its
permanent position and prepared for deployment elsewhere in accordance with
the new developments.
On the morning of 27 February, a reconnaissance patrol,
in the process of moving by foot into its assigned recon area, sighted four
NVA northwest of CAM LO. Setting up a hasty ambush the patrol subsequently
discovered that they were in contact with a much larger force, an estimated
100 NVA. The recon patrol broke contact and went under cover. L/3/4 (-) and
a platoon of tanks on a patrol mission north of CAM LO were ordered to
proceed west to the vicinity of the recon unit. Progress, however, was
slow, as the relief elements moved through heavy brush on the northern bank
of the CAM LO River. Division Forward sought other means to reinforce the
engaged patrol. A relief force from 3d Marines was requested; and, in
accordance with regimental contingency plans, a company size force was
deployed to link up with the recon patrol and exploit the contact. Company
G, 2/3 was designated as the relief unit at 271225H and commenced movement
at 271335H from Camp CARROLL to a point northwest of CAM LO on the southern
side of Hill 124 (YD 075623), where the recon patrol was then located.
At approximately the same time that G/2/3 departed Camp
CARROLL, L/3/4 made contact with a large sized enemy force east of the
engaged recon unit and almost directly north of CAM LO. After a heavy fire
fight in which L/3/4 suffered light casualties while killing three enemy (conf), that company and the tanks commenced
movement toward the recon patrol, however the tanks were unable to proceed
much further due to the densely foliated terrain. At 271610H, 2/3 assumed
OPCON of L/3/4 and the tanks and ordered them to set up nighttime positions
at the point of furthest penetration westward (YD102616). It was planned
that G/2/3 would link up with the recon team and then move to the L/3/4
perimeter for the night.
After moving across the CAM LO River, G/2/3 found the
terrain difficult to negotiate while moving north toward the recon patrol
and did not link up until 272342H. Because of the time, plans for G/2/3 and
recon to link up with I/3/4 during the night were cancelled, and the
company set up nighttime positions with recon.
It was also decided on the night of 27 February to
commit another company and the battalion command group form 2/3 on the
following morning, to further exploit recon’s contact in the vicinity of Hil 124. It was further planned that L/3/4 and the
tanks were to return to 3/4 via CAM LO as soon as possible on 28 February.
At 280630H L/3/4 came under enemy small arms fire and
60mm and 81/82mm mortar attack in its nighttime position. In addition to
the casualties suffered by L/3/4, two of the tanks were damaged by enemy
fire. One of the damaged tanks was unable to move as a result of a hit
received from a rocket propelled grenade, tough it was still capable of
firing. Counter mortar fire was returned b artillery and by the weapons
within L/3/4’s perimeter. Enemy fire was suppressed after L/3/4 had
received approximately 150 incoming rounds. Again at 280710H and 280830H
L/3/4 came under attack, receiving a total of 70 additional rounds. In
conjunction with the latter mortar attacks, L/3/4’s lines were also probed.
Enemy efforts ceased on every occasion only after heavy counter mortar
fire. Friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 18 WIA for the three attacks;
enemy casualties were 15 KIA (prob).
As a result of these three attacks the fresh 2/3 units
were ordered to link up with L/3/4 instead of G/2/3 as originally planned
on the preceding night, until the situation was stabilized. Furthermore,
L/3/4 was to be joined by its remaining platoon, which had been left in CAM
LO, and by a heavy section of tanks for the purpose of extracting the two
damaged tanks as soon as the situation permitted. G/2/3 was ordered to move
north to Hill 124, search out the area, and set up blocking positions
toward which 2/3 was to move after linking up with L/3/4. By 281025H the
2/3 command group and Company F, after fording the CAM LO River, had linked
up with L/3/4. Events, however, had already begun to alter the picture.
At 280955H G/2/3 received small arms fire while moving
north to Hill 124. The enemy, however, broke contact and fled to the north
immediately after the company returned fire. Continuing north, G/2/3 was
again taken under fire at 281030H, this time by enemy troops in well
camouflaged defensive positions. As the company moved forward, enemy resistance
stiffened. The company had to withdraw under fire in order to call in
supporting arms to neutralize the resistance. The company suffered 7 KIA,
including the company commander and 18 WIA as a result of this engagement.
Many of the casualties were suffered during repeated attempts to recover
those casualties taken initially. Supporting arms were called in, while the
casualties were recovered and med evaced.
During late morning on the 28th, it was
decided to commit another company to the north of Hill 124 to cut off any
enemy withdrawing from G/2/3’s contact and to relieve pressure on the
engaged company. M/3/4 was designated as the unit to be committed and was
to be helilifted onto Hill 162 (YD 070635). Commencing at 281338H, M/3/4
chopped to 2/3 and was lifted into the operating area. The lift was
completed by 281404H. Although no enemy resistance was encountered in the
landing zone, several mines/booby traps were detonated, resulting in 1 KIA
and 11 WIA. M/3/4 then began movement south toward Hill 124 and G/2/3.
During the early afternoon of the 28th, 2/3
reported sporadic contact in the vicinity of L/3/4’s position. In addition,
L/3/4’s third platoon arrived with the heavy section of tanks to extract
the two damaged tanks. Plans called for L/3/4 and the tanks to return to
their respective CPs on that day.
At approximately 281430H, the 2/3 command group and
F/2/3 commenced movement to link up with G/2/3 in order to prosecute the
action in that area and continue the operation. However, after moving
approximately 400 meters northwest of their starting point and previous
positions, these units were engaged by enemy small arms and 60mm mortar
fire from three sides. Company F and the command group suffered numerous
casualties during the initial encounter and while withdrawing to call in
supporting arms. Included among the initial casualties was the Battalion
Commander, Lieutenant Colonel V. OHANESIAN who was severely wounded and
died shortly thereafter. After LtCol OHANESIAN
had suffered his initial wounds, the command of the battalion passed to the
S-3, Majoer R.S. SHERIDAN, who was also wounded.
A withdrawal was completed back to the former position where L/3/4 and the
tanks were still located, and artillery was called in all around the
beleaguered units.
The Regimental Commander, Colonel J.P. LANIGAN, upon
learning of the casualties suffered within the 2/3 command group at 1630H
ordered Lieutenant Colonel E.R.DELONG, then Regimental Executive Officer,
to proceed to the 2/3 command group and take command. In addition, the operation being conducted by 3/3 in the vicinity
of the RAZORBACK was terminated, and 3/3 was alerted for commitment to the
operation. F/2/9, which was in DONG HA as a result of a ROUGH RIDER
that day, was committed also. F/2/9 chopped to 2/3 at 281730H and moved by
truck from DONG HA to CAM LO. LtCol DELONG, after
failing in an attempt to reach 2/3 by helicopter because of incoming mortar rounds and
small arms fire, landed near CAM LO and linked up with F/2/9, to move in by
foot with that unit to the 2/3 position. He assumed command of 2/3 upon
touching down and linking up with F/2/9.
The 2/3 elements and L/3/4 continued to receive mortar
fire sporadically for the remainder of the afternoon. Late in the day, as
attempts were made to bring in med-evac helicopters, enemy fire increased,
forcing the helicopters away from the LZ, thus preventing the evacuation of
dead and wounded. Enemy troops also probed the perimeter and made several
grenade attacks during this time. Contact ceased about 281930H.
At 281835H, 3/3,
having been committed, moved out with a command group and Companies I and L
for positions north and east of 2/3. By 282345H all units arrived at
positions north of CAM LO along the road leading north from the CAM LO
Bridge. Movement by foot then commenced into the objective area and was
completed by 010230 March.
That night F/2/9 and the new Battalion Commander of 2/3
moved by foot across the CAM LO River and moved north to link up with 2/3.
At 010340H March this movement was completed, and 2/3 completed
consolidation of its nighttime position. G/2/3 and M/3/4, which had been
unable to link up during the day, were both ordered to proceed separately
to 2/3’s main position on the evening of 28 February; however, due to the
distance and the terrain, they were ordered to secure nighttime positions
in their separate locations and complete the link up on 1 March.
Total friendly casualties for the operation as of
010001H March were 19 KIA, 1DOW, 145 WIA. Total enemy casualties were 30
KIA (conf) and 70 KIA (prob). The operation was continuing as of the end of
February.
The outposts were supplied this month in a regular
manner so that emergency resupply was not required. CA LU was supplied by
truck convoy along Route 9 on six occasions. D-5 was resupplied by Otters
overland from Camp CARROL on five occasions and by truck convoy along Route
558 on one occasion. The Otters moving overland saved about two hours’ time
and proved a far easier method of resupplying D-5. BA LONG Outpost and the
positions on top of the “ROCKPILE” and the “RAZORBACK” were resupplied by
helicopter as no other means was feasible. Poor flying weather for approximately
nine days during the month prevented resupply to the latter two outposts.
However, stock levels were sufficient to alleviate the necessity of
emergency resupply. In addition to replacing G/2/3 with H/2/3 by foot
movement as previously noted, W/1/13 was replaced by W/1/12 at BA LONG
Outpost by helicopter. Engineer efforts during the month of February were
directed toward repairing and improving roads and bridges within the 3d
Marines area of operations and the construction of an earth dam in the
vicinity of Camp CARROLL.
During the month of February, subordinate units
continued to organize and implement Civil Affairs Programs within their
assigned areas. MEDCAP visits were established on a regularly scheduled
basis to most of the hamlets within the 3d Marines area of operations.
Brush cutting by indigenous personnel along Route 9 and 558 continued
smoothly throughout the month though there was some work stoppage because
of a shortage of USAID supplies for payment. In conjunction with TET, a
luncheon was held at CAM LO District Headquarters with representatives from
each hamlet and major military unit within the 3d Marines area of
operations to aid in the continuing establishment of a rapport between the
Vietnamese people and American military forces. Also in conjunction with
TET, “Comfort Kits” were passed out in local dispensaries and hospitals. In
coming months the largest area of interest will be the establishment of an
active pacification program in the CUA Valley.
Psychological Operations during February were centered
primarily around the conduct of the III MAF TET PsyWar Campaign. Leaflets
were dropped by aircraft and hand distributed by patrols. Newspapers were
delivered to the people of CAM LO District through the auspices of District
Headquarters. In addition, loud speaker broadcast were undertaker from the
“ROCKPILE” directed at NVA troops in the area in an attempt to convince
them to rally to GVN. Also an Audio/Visual PhyOps
Team operated for two days in the CUA Valley, broadcasting themes directed
toward supporting the government. As in the field of Civil Affairs, much of
the PsyOps activity in the future will be centered
on the pacification program in the CUA Valley.
During the month of February, 3d Marines effort to
prevent enemy attacks on vital areas was successful and attempts to locate
and fix enemy units appear to have been equally successful. The major
contact by 3d Marines units at the end of the month seems to have blunted
an enemy attempt to move north on CAM LO and Route 9. Although mobility was
hampered somewhat by helicopter availability due to poor visibility, the
problem was overcome by rapid reaction time, frequent foot movement, and
the efforts of the individual Marine. In the future with the approach of
good weather and the attendant possibility of a VC/NVA offensive, 3d
Marines efforts will continue to focus upon detecting enemy movement,
denying enemy infiltration, preventing enemy attacks on vital installations
and outposts, and rapidly exploiting any intelligence reports or contact
with the enemy.
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