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3d Marine Regiment
March 1967
During the first days of February, 3d Marines continued
with its concept of conducting battalion operations on an alternating
basis, employing the two battalions under the operation control of the 3d Marines.
This concept evolved in an attempt to prevent the enemy from moving troops
and supplies prior to TET and was also directed toward leaving the enemy in
the least advantageous position prior to TET. Operations were conducted on
the basis of intelligence sightings and reconnaissance patrol reports. In
addition to large scale operations, the 3d Marines area of operations was
otherwise covered by aggressive patrolling and patrol base activities.
During TET all infantry and reconnaissance activities were limited to
intelligence gathering efforts. Following TET the alternating battalion
sized operations were again commenced, however, the emphasis was initially
on locating the results of enemy activity during TET and preventing attacks
on fixed installations as a result of the probable TET buildup by enemy
forces. A company sized reconnaissance in force north of CAM LO on 27
February resulted in the location of a major NVA force.
As a result of the engagements on 27-28 February a new
phase of operations began for the 3d Marines. As larger enemy forces were
encountered, it was necessary to commit additional Marine forces. Employing
two or three battalions at a time, 3d Marines attempted to counter enemy
infiltration and buildup in the area north of CAM LO River and to prevent
possible massing for ground attacks against fixed installations in the CAM
LO District. As the enemy still refused to stand and fight on most
occasions, Marine units were required to cover as much area as possible in
an attempt to ensnare the enemy and force him to fight. All multi-battalion
operations were conducted north of the CAM LO River and were employed as
the situation developed. Units were employed either to counter enemy
movements or in anticipation of same. The area of primary contact, from CAM
LO to CON THIEN, was covered on four separate occasions with contact, on
each occasion ranging from small units up to battalion size in strength.
All units permanently within the 3d Marines area of operations and those
battalions brought into the PRAIRIE area as a result of the increased
activity were employed on an alternating basis allowing recently engaged
units to rest and to refit. Units not operating in the main area of contact
north of CAM LO were required to defend key installations and conduct
continuous patrol activity in the remainder of the PRAIRIE Area of Operations.
Four to five battalions were OPCON to the 3d Marines during a major part of
the period covered.
On the morning of 27 February, a reconnaissance patrol,
in the process of moving by foot into its assigned recon area, sighted four
NVA northwest of CAM LO. Setting up a hasty ambush the patrol subsequently
discovered that they were in contact with a much larger force, an estimated
100 NVA. The recon patrol broke contact and went under cover. L/3/4 (-) and
a platoon of tanks on a patrol mission north of CAM LO were ordered to
proceed west to the vicinity of the recon unit. Progress, however, was
slow, as the relief elements moved through heavy brush on the northern bank
of the CAM LO River. Division Forward sought other means to reinforce the
engaged patrol. A relief force from 3d Marines was requested; and, in
accordance with regimental contingency plans, a company size force was
deployed to link up with the recon patrol and exploit the contact. Company
G, 2/3 was designated as the relief unit at 271225H and commenced movement
at 271335H from Camp CARROLL to a point northwest of CAM LO on the southern
side of Hill 124 (YD 075623), where the recon patrol was then located.
At approximately the same time that G/2/3 departed Camp
CARROLL, L/3/4 made contact with a large sized enemy force east of the
engaged recon unit and almost directly north of CAM LO. After a heavy fire
fight in which L/3/4 suffered light casualties while killing three enemy (conf), that company and the tanks commenced
movement toward the recon patrol, however the tanks were unable to proceed
much further due to the densely foliated terrain. At 271610H, 2/3 assumed
OPCON of L/3/4 and the tanks and ordered them to set up nighttime positions
at the point of furthest penetration westward (YD102616). It was planned
that G/2/3 would link up with the recon team and then move to the L/3/4
perimeter for the night.
After moving across the CAM LO River, G/2/3 found the
terrain difficult to negotiate while moving north toward the recon patrol
and did not link up until 272342H. Because of the time, plans for G/2/3 and
recon to link up with I/3/4 during the night were cancelled, and the
company set up nighttime positions with recon.
It was also decided on the night of 27 February to
commit another company and the battalion command group form 2/3 on the
following morning, to further exploit recon’s contact in the vicinity of
Hill 124. It was further planned that L/3/4 and the tanks were to return to
3/4 via CAM LO as soon as possible on 28 February.
At 280630H L/3/4 came under enemy small arms fire and
60mm and 81/82mm mortar attack in its nighttime position. In addition to
the casualties suffered by L/3/4, two of the tanks were damaged by enemy
fire. One of the damaged tanks was unable to move as a result of a hit
received from a rocket propelled grenade, tough it was still capable of
firing. Counter mortar fire was returned b artillery and by the weapons
within L/3/4’s perimeter. Enemy fire was suppressed after L/3/4 had
received approximately 150 incoming rounds. Again at 280710H and 280830H
L/3/4 came under attack, receiving a total of 70 additional rounds. In
conjunction with the latter mortar attacks, L/3/4’s lines were also probed.
Enemy efforts ceased on every occasion only after heavy counter mortar
fire. Friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 18 WIA for the three attacks;
enemy casualties were 15 KIA (prob).
As a result of these three attacks the fresh 2/3 units
were ordered to link up with L/3/4 instead of G/2/3 as originally planned
on the preceding night, until the situation was stabilized. Furthermore,
L/3/4 was to be joined by its remaining platoon, which had been left in CAM
LO, and by a heavy section of tanks for the purpose of extracting the two
damaged tanks as soon as the situation permitted. G/2/3 was ordered to move
north to Hill 124, search out the area, and set up blocking positions
toward which 2/3 was to move after linking up with L/3/4. By 281025H the
2/3 command group and Company F, after fording the CAM LO River, had linked
up with L/3/4. Events, however, had already begun to alter the picture.
At 280955H G/2/3 received small arms fire while moving
north to Hill 124. The enemy, however, broke contact and fled to the north
immediately after the company returned fire. Continuing north, G/2/3 was
again taken under fire at 281030H, this time by enemy troops in well
camouflaged defensive positions. As the company moved forward, enemy
resistance stiffened. The company had to withdraw under fire in order to
call in supporting arms to neutralize the resistance. The company suffered
7 KIA, including the company commander and 18 WIA as a result of this
engagement. Many of the casualties were suffered during repeated attempts
to recover those casualties taken initially. Supporting arms were called
in, while the casualties were recovered and med- evaced.
During late morning on the 28th, it was decided to
commit another company to the north of Hill 124 to cut off any enemy withdrawing
from G/2/3’s contact and to relieve pressure on the engaged company. M/3/4
was designated as the unit to be committed and was to be helilifted onto
Hill 162 (YD 070635). Commencing at 281338H, M/3/4 chopped to 2/3 and was
lifted into the operating area. The lift was completed by 281404H. Although
no enemy resistance was encountered in the landing zone, several
mines/booby traps were detonated, resulting in 1 KIA and 11 WIA. M/3/4 then
began movement south toward Hill 124 and G/2/3.
During the early afternoon of the 28th, 2/3 reported
sporadic contact in the vicinity of L/3/4’s position. In addition, L/3/4’s
third platoon arrived with the heavy section of tanks to extract the two
damaged tanks.
At approximately 281430H, the 2/3 command group and F/2/3
commenced movement to link up with G/2/3 in order to prosecute the action
in that area and continue the operation. However, after moving
approximately 400 meters northwest of their starting point and previous
positions, these units were engaged by enemy small arms and 60mm mortar
fire from three sides. Company F and the command group suffered numerous
casualties during the initial encounter and while withdrawing to call in
supporting arms. Included among the initial casualties was the Battalion
Commander, Lieutenant Colonel V. OHANESIAN who was severely wounded and
died shortly thereafter. After LtCol OHANESIAN
had suffered his initial wounds, the command of the battalion passed to the
S-3, Major R.S. SHERIDAN, who was also wounded. A withdrawal was completed
back to the former position where L/3/4 and the tanks were still located,
and artillery was called in all around the position.
The Regimental Commander, Colonel J.P. LANIGAN, upon
learning of the casualties suffered within the 2/3 command group at 1630H
ordered Lieutenant Colonel E.R.DELONG, then Regimental Executive Officer,
to proceed to the 2/3 command group and take command. In addition, the operation being conducted by 3/3 in the vicinity
of the “RAZORBACK” was terminated, and 3/3 was alerted for commitment to
the operation. F/2/9, which was in DONG HA as a result of a ROUGH RIDER
that day, was committed also. F/2/9 chopped to 2/3 at 281730H and moved by
truck from DONG HA to CAM LO. LtCol DELONG, after
failing in an attempt to reach 2/3 by helicopter because of incoming mortar rounds and
small arms fire, landed near CAM LO and linked up with F/2/9, to move in by
foot with that unit to the 2/3 position. He assumed command of 2/3 upon
touching down and linking up with F/2/9.
The 2/3 elements and L/3/4 continued to receive mortar
fire sporadically for the remainder of the afternoon. Late in the day, as
attempts were made to bring in med-evac helicopters, enemy fire increased,
forcing the helicopters away from the LZ, thus preventing the evacuation of
dead and wounded. Enemy troops also probed the perimeter and made several
grenade attacks during this time. Contact ceased about 281930H.
At 281835H, 3/3,
having been committed, moved out with a command group and Companies I and L
for positions north and east of 2/3. By 282345H all units arrived at
positions north of CAM LO along the road leading north from the CAM LO
Bridge. Movement by foot then commenced into the objective area and was
completed by 010230 March.
That night F/2/9 and the new Battalion Commander of 2/3
moved by foot across the CAM LO River and moved north to link up with 2/3.
At 010340H March this movement was completed, and 2/3 completed
consolidation of its nighttime position. G/2/3 and M/3/4, which had been
unable to link up during the day, were both ordered to proceed separately
to 2/3’s main position on the evening of 28 February; however, due to the
distance and the terrain, they were ordered to secure nighttime positions
in their separate locations and complete the link up on 1 March.
Med-evac of casualties was commenced at 010700H and
completed by 0745H. 2/3 passed the remainder of the day in position with
the new CO reorganizing the battalion, compiling accurate friendly and
enemy casualty reports, and consolidating Companies G/2/3 and M/3/4. M/3/4
arrived at 010945H; G/2/3 arrived at approximately 011150H. F/2/9 linked up
with two squads from F/2/3 which had been separated from the main body and
had spent the night on Hill 84 (YD092618), searched out the area, and
returned to 2/3’s primary position by 011300H. L/3/4 moved into the area in
which the main elements of 2/3 had been hit on the preceding day and
recovered two friendly KIA’s at 011400H. In addition, the area surrounding
2/3’s primary position was thoroughly searched out and the position
expanded with company and platoon outposts on surrounding key terrain
features.
At 011405H, F/2/9 commenced movement to CAM LO for
return to 2/9. The situation had stabilized sufficiently to allow the
withdrawal of this company and at 011537 H F/2/9 arrived in the vicinity of
CAM LO Bridge and chopped to 2/9. M/3/4
was designated to move to support 3/3 to the north, and at 011622H chopped
to 3/3 and commenced movement by foot. However, after proceeding
approximately 500 meters, M/3/4 encountered several enemy
in the area and became engaged in a fire fight. At 011707H, M/3/4 chopped
back to 2/3, which was better able to support the company. The company
returned to 2/3’s primary position after pursuing the contact and set up
nighttime positions in the area. During the night of 1-2 March, 2/3 made
contact with the enemy on two occasions inflicting 10 KIA (C) and 21 KIA
(P) on enemy units.
3/3 having
arrived in the objective area at 010230H commenced a sweep to the southwest
at 010920H. On 1 March, 3/3 made contact with NVA units on two separate
occasions while moving west. At 011840H, I/3/3 captured one enemy, PW
(NVA), carrying a radio; the man and the radio were evacuated to ITT. 3/3
set up nighttime position in the vicinity of (YD103630). By this time the
scheme of maneuver had changed.
On the morning of 1 March, as a result of increased
contact and sightings made on the preceding day and because of the
necessity of withdrawing 2/3 for its previously scheduled rotation to
Okinawa, it was decided to commit another battalion to the operation. To
provide adequate fire support to units who were now at the maximum range of
105mm howitzer support from Camp CARROLL, A/1/40 was moved from DONG HA to
a position in the (YD 0657) grid square. At 011500H, 1/9 arrived in DONG HA
from PHU BAI, having been designated as the battalion to be committed. At
011555H, the first wave of 1/9 touched down on Hill 162 (YD070635), and the
battalion chopped to 3d Marines. The helilift was completed by 011832H, and
1/9 set up nighttime positions in the vicinity.
The new scheme
of maneuver envisioned 1/9 and 3/3 moving north along parallel axis to
seize Regimental objectives 1-5 (085633, 100665, for 3/3; 050636, 070657,
080655 for 1/9). 2/3 was to return to its rear at Camp CARROLL on 2
March for rotation to Okinawa. M/3/4, which had been scheduled to chop to
3/3 late on 1 March but had returned to 2/3 because of enemy activity
enroute, was to be helilifted to 3/3 on the morning of 2 March. ARVN Ranger
units were to be moved into blocking position to the north of the two
attacking battalions.
On the morning of 2 March, Division Forward and 3d
Marines requested that 2/3 be allowed to remain in the operation area for
an additional two days to continue the operation rather than depart for
Okinawa. Division and higher headquarters approved this request and 2/3 set
out to the west toward Hill 124 to recover the bodies of two Marines believed
to be left in the area from G/2/3’s contact on 28 Feb and to search out
that area. M/3/4 was to remain with 2/3 for this movement. L/3/4 commenced
movement with tanks for the CAM LO Bridge at 020800H and arrived at
021203H, chopping to 3/4 at that time.
At noon on 2 March, it was decided that M/3/4 would be chopped to 3/3 in
order to give this 2 company battalion a maneuver element, and the company
was helilifted to positions in the vicinity of the 3/3/CP. At 021310H, the
helilift commenced, and M/3/4 chopped to 3/3. 2/3 was then given the
abbreviated mission of recovering the two bodies and searching out the area
south of Hill 124. The battalion was to return to Camp CARROLL at the completion
of this mission to allow enough lead time for proper preparation for
rotation to Okinawa. At 021815H, 2/3 recovered the two bodies that had been
left in the area of G/2/3’s firefight on 28 Feb and movement commenced
shortly thereafter to CAM LO for pick up by trucks and movement to Camp
CARROLL. 2/3 arrived at CAM LO at 030205H and boarded trucks, the battalion
arrived at Camp CARROLL at 030305H terminating its portion of the
operation.
On the morning
of 2 March, 3/3 set out for Objective 1 (YD 085633) with I/3/3 in the lead.
About midday, I/3/3 made contact with enemy forces at two separate
locations to the east of Objective1. 3/3 continued on to seize Objective 1,
during the course of the afternoon the objective was take and 3/3 swung
north toward Objective 2 (YD100665) with L/3/3 in the lead. Contact
continued during the course of the day, with L/3/3 encountering most of the
resistance during the afternoon. On the evening of 2 March, L/3/3 received
an estimated 75 82mm mortar rounds at 1720H; this attack was followed by
another at 1730H and another at 1820H. The latter attack also included
small arms fire. There were a total of 13 KIA and 12 WIA from these three
attacks. 3/3 set up night positions south of OBJECTIVE2. During the night,
L/3/3 received an additional 25 rounds of 81/82mm mortar fire at 030445H in
their nighttime position.
At 020745H, A/1/9, prior to moving out in accordance
with the days planned operations, received approximately 70 60mm mortar
rounds from the northwest. Fire was returned with 60mm mortars and 155mm
howitzers causing the enemy fire to cease. The attack resulted in 2
friendly WIA. At 020805H, 1/9 commenced movement to the north toward
Objective 4 (YD 070657)
At 021240H the 1/9 command group and C/1/9 received 20
rounds of 81/82 mm mortar fire, at 021340H, 24 additional mortar rounds
were received. On the afternoon of 2 March, Objective 4 was seized and
nighttime positions were set up in that area. Again that evening at 021915H
the 1/9 CP was hit by mortar fire, receiving 20 81/82 mortar rounds. At
030425H the 1/9 CP received another 21 incoming mortar rounds.
On 3 March, 3/3
moved north toward Objective 2 (YD100665) arriving at positions just to the
south of it during the night. During the course of the day, only sporadic
contact was encountered. At 031900H, however, L/3/3 received an estimated
10 rounds of mortar fire as well as sniper fire. Fire was returned
resulting in 12 enemy KIA (c). The incident
occurred at (YD 109659). L/3/3 set up nighttime positions to the south of
the objective. Nighttime contact was minimal.
On 3 March, 1/9 moved north from Objective 4 (YD
070657) to Objective 5 (YD 080665) encountering enemy units throughout the
day. At 030720H, an AO sighted three groups of approximately 250 enemy
troops each in the area in which 1/9 was operating (YD 055668, 071668,
083662). Artillery and air were called in. 1/9 subsequently conducted a
sweep of the area discovering enemy dead and making contact with small
groups (up to 30-40) of enemy trying to flee the area. Numerous enemy
were killed as a result. During the afternoon and evening 1/9 command group
was mortared three times with a total of 180 rounds received, resulting in 1
KIA and 23 WIA. A/1/9 was mortared during the day also. Nighttime positions
were set up to the west of Objective 5. 1/9 had one probing incident during
the night.
During the course of the day, a helicopter was shot
down at (YD 089665) and a platoon from C/1/9 was moved into the area to
protect the downed helicopter after the crew and the passengers had been
extracted.
On the night of 3 March plans were made for the
following two days. Commencing 4 March, 1/9 was to continue northeast
through Objective 5 to Objective 6 (YD 095683) then east t intermediate
Objective A THON TRUG AN (YD 121683), then on to Objective 7 PHU PHUONG
(vicinity YD 148681), then southeast to the final objective at (YD 165641),
returning to DONG HA on order. 3/3
was to continue through Objective 2 swinging east to the vicinity of
(YD110665), then sweeping southwest to (YD 088627), then southeast to (YD
119611). The 39th Ranger Battalion was to screen to the
north and east along the exposed flank of 1/9. All movement of Marine units
was contingent upon the extraction of the downed helicopter on 4 March.
The helicopter was lifted out at 041200H, and the
battalions commenced the attack at 1230H. After seizing Objective 5, 1/9
commenced movement toward Objective 6 (YD 095683). At 041310H, while
enroute the battalion received 5 well placed mortar rounds within the march
column. These rounds were followed shortly thereafter by an additional 150
enemy 81/82mm mortar rounds which landed beyond the march column inflicting
no casualties. Air and artillery support was called in on the suspected
enemy mortar positions. Total friendly casualties were 3 WIA.
Contact during
the day for 1/9 was continuous but not heavy, excluding the mortar attack.
At 1600H, 3/3 requested that 1/9 hold in the blocking position as L/3/3
drove north after a fleeing contact. 1/9 held for 90 minutes with no
contact. The battalion then moved to the western edge of intermediate
Objective A and set up nighttime positions. Also, a tank platoon from D/1/9
was sent to 3/3 to move two M42 duel 40mm’s and one tank back to 1/9’s
positions as these vehicles had been placed under the operational control
of that battalion. Only two minor incidents were reported by 1/9 during the
night.
On the afternoon
of 4 March, after the completed seizure of Objective 2, L/3/3, which had
been given the mission of moving into THON BAI Hamlet at (YD 117665),
encountered heavy resistance at that location at 041500H. One tank was
destroyed during this encounter by a rocket-propelled grenade. Mortar and
small arms fire was received as the company swept the village and then
wheeled north to crush the enemy between the attacking forces and a hasty
blocking position set up by elements of 1/9 to the north. After pursuing
the enemy until the contact dissipated, L/3/3 reversed step and swept back
to the south through the hamlet, setting up nighttime positions on the edge
wit I/3/3 and the battalion command group.
M/3/4 which had
replaced the platoon from C/1/9 as security for the downed helicopter
remained south of the remainder of 3/3 after the aircraft had been
extracted at 041200H. Night positions were set up at (YD 083644), and the
company’s only contact of the day occurred at 042210H when a lone NVA was
killed while trying to infiltrate the perimeter.
On the afternoon of 4 March, A/1/40 (USA) displaced
from grid square (YD 0657) to grid square (YD 1359) in the vicinity of CAM
LO, to support the operation to the north from a closer firing position.
On 5 March, 1/9 encountered heavy harassing and
delaying action by the enemy as it advanced east toward Regimental
Objective 7 (vicinity 148681). With two companies forward, Company D to the
north and Company C to the south, and company A to the rear as security for
the Command Group, the battalion was continually in contact with small elements
of the enemy. At 051630H, Company D encountered the heaviest contact of the
day with 40-50 enemy (YD 136673), receiving 50-60
incoming mortar (60mm) rounds in addition to heavy small arms fire. During
the same period, Company C received 25 incoming 82mm mortar rounds.
Artillery was brought to bear on the enemy and suppressed the enemy mortar
fire; however, small arms fire continued. Enemy fire continued to originate
from the hamlet between Company C and the remainder of the battalion and
was effectively silenced only after artillery was walked into the intervening
area. Medevac was unable to be completed that night, and Company D linked
up with the command group and Company A to set up nighttime positions at
the northern end of PHU AN. Company C spent the night at the southern end
of the hamlet. Heavy defensive fires and TPQ’s were conducted during the
night and 1/9 passed the night of 5 March uneventfully.
On 5 March, 3/3
swept southwest to link up with M/3/4, which had passed the previous night
in a separate position, and continued on to the vicinity of (YD 088627).
The battalion then swept east to (YD 117606) where nighttime positions were
set up. There was only one minor contact during the entire day and night.
Because of a
boundary change with ARVN units to the east of 1/9, Regimental Objective 7
was eliminated. Also, it was decided to have 3/3 seize THIEN CHAN (YD
166641) instead of 1/9. 3/3 was to be resupplied early on 6 March and
provide security for the resupply column continuing on to 1/9. 1/9 was to
march south to link up with the resupply column, and then continue on to
DONG HA.
3/3 linked up
with the resupply column early on the morning of 6 March and commenced movement
north with resupply for 1/9 at 061100H. 1/9 swept through THU AN while Company C blocked to the south and then moved
south to link up with 3/3 for resupply. Linkup was completed at 1400H,
whereupon 3/3 swept southeast to seize THIEN CHANH. 1/9 continued on to the
CAM LO Bridge where the battalion boarded trucks and commenced movement to
DONG HA. 1/9 chopped to Division Forward at 061850H. 3/3 completed its
sweep through THIEN CHANH and was also moved to CAM LO Bridge to await
transportation to the battalion permanent position south of THON SON LAM.
M/3/4 chopped back to 3/4 at 062030H. All units had returned to their
permanent positions by 062125H and the operation was terminated.
Total enemy casualties for the portion of PRAIRIE II
including 27 Feb - 6 Mar, as inflicted by the 3d Marines, were 365 KIA (C),
192 KIA (P), 10 PW (NVA) and 1 PW (VC).
During the course of the multi-battalion operation to
the north of CAM LO, 2/3 which had returned to Camp CARROLL early on 3
March was relieved of responsibility of the eastern half of the 3d Marines
area of operation by 3/9 at 031315H. Departing for DONG HA shortly
thereafter, 2/3 completed final preparations for rotation to Okinawa. On
the day preceding the relief, at 021800H, K/3/9 relieved H/2/3 at BA LONG
and chopped to the 3d Marines. On 6 March, 3/9 was ready for operational
commitments. At 061335H March, as the multi-battalion cooperation was
terminating north of CAM LO, 3/9 was chopped to Division (Fwd) and moved to
DONG HA to participate in an operation in the vicinity of GIO LINH. With a
command group and Companies L and M, 3/9 departed leaving a platoon from
Company I and portions of H&S as the sole remaining infantry units at
Camp CARROLL. In addition, there was
another platoon from I/3/9 at the KHE GIA Bridge and a platoon from K/3/3
at the D-5 Outpost. By that evening, 3/3 completed movement into its own
area of operations, but the remaining I/3/9 platoon which had been
providing security for THON SON LAM base camp was not scheduled to return
to Camp CARROLL until 7 March. Thus, Camp CARROLL area of operations
had one infantry company to defend the area on the night of 6-7 March.
At 062358H March, enemy units to the north commenced a
mortar and rocket attack on Camp CARROLL which lasted about one hour.
Counter mortar fire commenced at 070005H and continued until enemy fire was
suppressed. Again at 070407H, Camp CARROLL was attacked with mortars and
rockets. The second attack lasted approximately 30 minutes and was again
suppressed by counter mortar fire from the plateau. At 070630H, the third
and final attack commenced and was suppressed after approximately twenty
minutes. 346 mortar/rocket rounds, by crater count, fell on the camp during
the three attacks. Friendly casualties were 6 KIA and 41 WIA, plus
extensive superficial damage to tents and vehicles at the northern end of
the perimeter. Only one artillery weapon, a 175mm howitzer, was damaged and
that was not severe. Most of the damaged equipment was repaired by second
echelon maintenance. Most of the rounds fell at the northern end of the
perimeter.
On the morning of 7 March, aerial observers to the
north of DONG HA Mountain spotted several fleeing enemy and called in
artillery strikes resulting in several enemy killed. The enemy was seen to
be carrying rocket tubes. During the day, patrols were conducted to the
south of CAM LO River, and the southern slope of the DONG HA/DONG MA
Mountain complex was covered with heavy direct fire brought to bear by
tanks, ontos, duel 40mm’s and quad 50’s. In addition, at 071705H, K/3/4
chopped to the 3d Marines to provide additional security for Camp CARROLL
during the absence of 3/9. Plans were also made to conduct an operation
north of the CAM LO River in the vicinity of the enemy mortar sites to destroy
them and prevent the enemy from reoccupying the area. In the meantime, Camp
CARROLL commenced repairing the damage.
On 8 March,
M/3/3 commenced a systemized search of the area to the west of DONG HA
Mountain in the valley just south of “MUTTER” Ridge. This company-sized
patrol base was to be coordinated with the battalion sized operation to the
east; however, the latter operation was delayed several days as more forces
were made available. On 8 March, direct fire weapons again hammered the
southern slopes of DONG HA/DONG MA Mountain complex in order to prevent
enemy units from moving into possible mortar positions prior to nightfall.
Extensive H&I’s were conducted throughout the night.
At 081300H, 3d Marines assumed operational control of
2/26 which had been moved into the PRAIRIE area from DA NANG. 2.26 set up a
base camp south of the CAM LO River (vicinity 085575) in preparation for h
the operation to the north.
At 091121H, the 3/9 command group and Companies L and M
returned to OPCON of 3d Marines from Division Forward, and K /3/4 returned
to 3/4. The scheme of maneuver now evolved into a two battalion operation
with M/3/3 operating in conjunction to the west. With Companies L and M,
the 3/9 command group was to operate in the DONG HA/DONG MA Mountain
complex to the north of grid line 62. 3/9 was to commence from the east and
sweep in a western direction along the southern ridge line, then move north
over the top of Dong Ha and back in an eastern direction along the northern
ridgeline. With Companies E, G, and H, the 2/26 command group was to move
north across the CAM LO River to seize Objective 1 (vicinity YD 100625) and
2 (vicinity YD 105645) and move to a blocking position further north (YD
095673 to YD 116662) to support ARVN airborne sweep west from vicinity Route
1. Movement was to commence on 10 March. M/3/3 was to approach DONG HA Mountain from the west then swing
south to the CAM LO River, the east again along the northern bank.
At 100830H March, 2/26, after out-posting a company on
the northern bank of the CAM LO River on the preceding day , commenced
movement north into its assigned operating area. At 100930H, 3/9 commenced
movement from Camp CARROLL into its assigned operating area. M/3/3 had already been inserted into
its operation area on 8 March and had been conducting heavy patrolling
activities in the area. In support of the operation, F/2/12 displaced
from DONG HA to CAM LO on 10 March to provide artillery support.
On 10 March, operating units had no contact. G/2/26
seized Objective 1 on the afternoon of 10 March. That evening it was
decided that 3/4, which had been operating to the east of 2/26, would be
chopped to the 3d Marines from Division Forward on the following day and
continue operations in conjunction with 2/26. 3/4 was to move from its
previously held position on Route 8B leading north from CAM LO to an
objective and blocking position located in the vicinity of (YD 113675). 3/4
was to hold up at its nighttime position of 10 March until 2/26 moved
abreast, then both units were to advance north on line toward their final
objectives/blocking positions. Both 3/4 and 2/26 were to hold in their
blocking positions while ARVN airborne units sweep west across their
fronts. 3/9 and M/3/3 were to
continue their previously assigned missions.
At 110800H March, the 3d Marines assumed OPCON of 3/4.
All units except 3/4 commenced movement. M/3/3 during the day advanced halfway up the western slope to DONG
HA Mountain then turned south toward the CAM LO River, setting up nighttime
positions in the vicinity of (YD 008572). 3/9 continued its advance
toward the top of DONG HA Mountain from the east and set up nighttime
positions at (YD 025585). 2/26 in addition to moving north left E/2/26 in
the vicinity of (YD 104615) to destroy a bunker complex in the area. The remainder
of the battalion moved north and Objective 2 was seized by the lead
elements by that afternoon with nighttime positions being set up in that
vicinity. 3/4 commenced movement on its final objective at 110915H, as 2/26
units encountered slow progress in the rough terrain to the east. 3/4 was
the only unit which made contact on 11 March; however, on the two occasions
in which contact was made, the enemy fled immediately thereafter. 3/4
reached its final objective on the evening of 11 March and entered with no
resistance, setting up nighttime positions there. That night, 3/4 had the
only contact in a brief fire fight at 120513H which resulted in 5 enemy KIA
(C) and 1 KIA (P), while 3/4 sustained 1 KIA and 1 WIA.
On 12 March, all units except 3/4 continued movement. M/3/3 moved east along the northern
bank of the CAM LO River to (YD 055570), where nighttime positions were
established. 3/9 moved over the top of DONG HA Mountain and swung back
to the east along the northern ridgeline, setting up nighttime positions in
the vicinity of (YD 039608). 2/26 moved north on its final objective.
E/2/26, which had remained to the south to destroy an enemy bunker complex,
completed its task and was helilifted to link up with the command group to
the north. By nightfall 2/26 occupied nighttime positions in the vicinity
of its final objective, preparing to sweep the village in the objective
area on the following day. 3/4 remained in position and conducted local
patrol activities. The only contact of the day was made by 2/26 on two
separate occasions while moving north, resulting in 1 enemy KIA (C) and 1
KIA (P).
On 13 March, plans called for all units to continue
previously assigned missions, except for 3/4 which was to move north and
east to seize Objectives 6, 7, and 8 previously assigned to ARVN airborne
units operating in that area. M/3/3
completed its assigned mission, moved south across the CAM LO River, and
back to its CP by truck along Route 9, arriving there at 131310H. The
command group and I/3/9 were also moved out of their operating areas on the
afternoon of 13 March; the movement, by helicopter, was completed at
131440H, 2/26 reached its limit of advance at road running east to west at
the 688 grid line, after sweeping through the village area of its final objective.
Nighttime positions were set up in the vicinity of (YD 114685). At 131320H,
3/4 was ordered to move out and seize the hamlet at ARVN Objective 6 (YD
155702) which the battalion secured by 131546H. 3/4 then moved south to set
up nighttime positions at (YD 155693).
On 14 March, plans called for all units to complete
their assigned missions. M/3/9 was to move east on then south to Route 9
for pickup and return to Camp CARROLL; 2/26 was to continue to search its
final objective area and be prepared to move to CAM LO for truck pickup or
to be extracted by helicopter. 3/4 was to seize ARVN Objectives 7 and 8,
then continue east to Route 1 for pickup and return to DONG HA, chopping to
Division Forward upon pickup.
At 140730H, 3/4 moved south toward ARVN Objective 7 (YD
168700); lead elements of the battalion entered the objective at 0815H and
secured it shortly thereafter. At 0859H, K/3/4 moved on toward ARVN
Objective 8 and commenced sweeping the area at 0935H. At 1110H, 3/4 swept
through ARVN Objective A, while moving on to the pickup point (YD 216698)
at 1326H and boarded trucks for DONG HA, at 1430H, chopping to Division
Forward.
2/26 searched out the area of its final objective on
the morning of 14 March, finding several mines and some enemy positions. At 1330H, 2/26 commenced movement by
helicopter to 3/3’s primary position south of THON SON LAM. By 1720H,
the helilift was complete. M/3/9, which had remained in the 3/9 operating
area an extra day, moved east and then south across the CAM LO River,
arriving there at 1715H. By 1905H, M/3/9 had returned to Camp CARROLL,
completing the move by truck. Total enemy casualties for this operation
were 7 KIA (C), 2 KIA (P) and 1 PW (NVA).
Planning called for another multi-battalion operation
to follow immediately, a second phase -so to speak- to search out the area
north of DONG HA Mountain and to the west of the area in which 2/26 had
operated. The operation was to involve three battalions. The lead battalion
was to move from an assembly area just west of CAM LO across the CAM LO
River and northwest into an area known as “HELICOPTER” Valley (vicinity YD
035640). A second battalion was to follow in trace of the lead battalion,
then sweep southwest along the valley north of DONG HA Mountain and south
of “MUTTER” Ridge. The third battalion was to set up a firing position for
direct fire weapons south of “MUTTER” Ridge in the valley between DONG HA
Mountain and the “RAZORBACK” (vicinity XD 978588); this unit was to cover
“MUTTER” Ridge and the battalion moving southwest in the valley along the
southern slope of “MUTTER” Ridge. The lead battalion was to move into the
assembly area on D-Day, with one company outposted north of the CAM LO
River and was to commence its portion of the operation on D+1. The second
battalion was to move into the assembly area onD+1, with a company
outposted north of the CAM LO River, and commencement on D+2. The direct
fire weapons were to move into the fire support position on order. D-Day
was to be 15 March.
At 151000H, 1/9 chopped to the 3d Marines, as the
designated lead battalion. At 1100H, the lead company, C/1/9 departed DONG
HA for the assembly area. By 1800H, the battalion command group and
Companies A and D had also arrived, and C/1/9 was outposted just north of
the CAM LO River. The battalion assembly area was in the vicinity of (YD
087597). 3/3, which was to follow in
trace of 1/9, was preparing for relief of defensive responsibilities in the
THON SON LAM area by 2/26. On the evening of 15 March, it was decided
to delay the operation until 17 March in order to coordinate the timing of
this operation with the employment of the SLF.
New missions
were assigned to all units for the intervening time. 3/3 was to hold in
place. 2/26 was to conduct a company patrol to the west of the THON SON
LAM position along the KHE GIANG THOAN, and the SUOI TIEN HIEN Rivers west
to grid line 90 and north to grid line 55. 1/9 was to conduct extensive
patrols north of the CAM LO River between grid lines 05 and 11. 3/9, which
had been the reserve battalion for the forthcoming operations, was to
conduct a company sweep of the southeast of the D-5 Outpost, centered along
the road running east from Route 558. Fire Support for this company-sized
operation was to be provided by 2 155mm howitzers from M/4/12 displaced to
a firing position just south of D-5. The 3/9 company sweep was to continue
until 18 March; All other activities were to be terminated with the continuation
of the multi-battalion operation on 17 March.
At 160730H, 1/9 commenced its assigned patrols. At 161000H,
I/3/9, designated for the company sweep southeast of D-5, commenced
movement to the objective area. At 161200H, 2/26 commenced its assigned
patrols, however, the 2/26 company sized patrol was shortened because of
the time factor. The only contact of the day was encountered by I/3/9 and
resulted in 1 enemy KIA (conf).
On the afternoon
of 16 March, patrolling units at KHE SANH encountered heavy enemy contact
as did relief elements. As a result, I/3/3, originally assigned to
participate in the multi-battalion operation was placed on an alert status
for movement to KHE SANH. All other units concerned made preparations
for continuation of the multi-battalion operation on 17 March. 2/26 was
also to continuing patrolling to the west and send out an additional patrol
to the west of the “RAZORBACK”.
At 170700H, 1/9 commenced movement northwest toward
“HELICOPTER” Valley. At 171445H,
3/3, after being relieved by 2/26, commenced movement for the assembly area
in the vicinity of the one previously occupied by 1/9. Approximately the
same time, I/3/3 commenced helilift to KHE SANH and chopped to SOP KHE
SANH. The I/3/3 helilift was completed at 171730H. Only 1/9 made light
contact during the day.
1/9 set up nighttime positions in the vicinity of (YD
058634) with one company to the west. 3/3
set up nighttime positions with the command group and Companies K and L in
the vicinity of YD 094585). Intentions for 18 March were to have 1/9
continue movement northwest and 3/3 to commence movement into the objective
area. 2/26 was to move a company north with direct fire weapons (tank,
ontos, and dual 40mm’s) and be in position by 181000H.
At 180800H, 3/3
commenced movement across the CAM LO River. 3/3 was ordered to search out
the area on the northern bank of the CAM LO River and link up with a recon
patrol in contact to the northeast. The link up was completed by 1210H and
the patrol was extracted to the south.
3/3 setup nighttime positions for the two companies north of the
river, while the command group and security remained south of the river.
At 0830H, G/2/26 departed the 2/26 primary position with direct fire
support weapons to establish fire support position to the south. The units
were in place in the vicinity of (XD 978588) by mid-morning. At 0837H, 1/9
commenced movement of its elements to the north and west to recon in force
the surrounding areas. 1/9 moved to nighttime positions held on 17 March
and set up in the vicinity of (YD 046635). I/3/9 was helilifted back to
Camp CARROLL on the afternoon of 18 March. There was no contact on 18
March. At 182400H, Operation PRAIRIE II concluded, and Operation PRAIRIE
III commenced, as the 3d Marines continued with its multi-battalion
operation north of DONG HA Mountain.
Intentions for
19 March remained the same for the operating units. All 3/3 units moved
across the CAM LO River on the morning of 19 March and commenced searching
out the area in the vicinity of (YD 0861). At midday, K/3/3 located a large
enemy rocket site (YD 072618), presumably one of those used to attack Camp CARROLL
on the night of 6-7 March. At 191440H, I/3/3 commenced helilifting from KHE
SANH to the 3/3 primary position, its security mission at KHE SANH
completed. The company arrived at 191552H and chopped back to 3/3;
whereupon they committed to the operation. I/3/3 moved by truck to the
operating area and set up nighttime positions at (YD 095583) to the south
of the CAM LO River. The remainder of the battalion remained to the north
of the river.
1/9 units again searched to the west and north of their
positions during the day, returning to the same nighttime positions that
had been occupied on the previous night (YD 046636). At 191925H, the 1/9
position received incoming 82mm mortar rounds. Approximately 85-90 rounds
fell on the position, having been fired from positions to the northwest.
Counter mortar fire was immediately brought to bear and succeeded in
suppressing enemy fire. Marine casualties sustained were 6 KIA, 37 WIA.
G/2/26 maintained its direct fire position south of MUTTERS Ridge on 19
March and conducted patrols to the east and north along the valley between
the ridgeline and DONG HA Mountain. In addition, 2/26 conducted patrols to
the west of the RAZORBACK. Missions
remained the same for units on 20 March, except that 3/3 was to continue to
search out the area in which the rocket site had been located on 19 March
and provide security for an EOD team which was to inspect the rocket site
and blow duds.
On 20 March, 3/3
continued to search out the area for rocket sites, and 1/9 conducted heavy patrol
activities north and west of its nighttime positions. On the afternoon of
20 March, plans were laid for the following two days. 1/9 was to relieve
3/3 of its search mission in the vicinity of the rocket site. In addition,
the battalion was to search out the stream bed known as KHE MAI (vicinity
YD 0655605) and move into an assembly area in the grid square (YD 0958) in
preparation for a helolift to the north on 22 and 23 March. 3/3, upon
relief by 1/9 was to move to an assembly area to the east for the night and
be prepared to attack north on 22 March following in trace of grid line 10.
In accordance with these plans, 1/9 moved southeast, linking up with 3/3
and assuming its mission on the evening of 20 March. Nighttime positions
were set up in the vicinity of (YD 053620). 3/3, upon relief by 1/9 moved
to the vicinity of (YD 085598) and set up nighttime positions. G/2/26 was
withdrawn from its direct fire position to the south and remained for the
night at the permanent position at the northern base of the ROCKPILE.
On the morning
of 21 March, 3/3 was ordered to commence its sweep north along grid line 10
on the same day. The 3/3 area was bounded on the west by gridline (YD 08)
and on the east by the road from CAM LO to PHU AN (vicinity grid line YD
13), and on the north by the road just south of gridline (YD 69). 3/3 was
to cover thoroughly the area 1500 meters to either side of the (YD 10) grid
line. On the afternoon of 21 March, 3/3 moved east to carry out its
assigned mission and set up nighttime positions in the vicinity of (YD
096610). 3/3 experienced the only contact on 21 March; however, the enemy
broke contact immediately.
1/9 continued with its previously assigned mission,
moving into the assigned assembly area at (YD 086590), south of the river,
for its nighttime position. G/2/26 resumed its direct fire position at (XD
978588) on 21 March. On the morning of 21 March, M/3/9 was assigned a two
day search and destroy mission in the vicinity of (YD 164619) as the result
of aerial photo intelligence locating an enemy rocket site in the area. The
company moved into the area by vehicle from Camp CARROLL and set up
nighttime positions at (YD 146615).
On 22 March, 3/3
moved north along its axis of advance through thick terrain. Movement was
exceedingly slow and nighttime positions were set up at (XD 092591) with
the leading units setting in as far north as (YD 115640). 1/9 continued
with assigned patrol activities. G/2/26 conducted a company sized patrol
activity along the valley between MUTTER Ridge and DONG HA Mountain. M/3/9
completed its search and destroy mission with negative results and returned
to Camp CARROLL arriving at 221557H. Although a number of enemy fighting
positions and camp sites had been discovered, there had been no firm
contact with the enemy, except for the mortar attack on 1/9, since the
commencement of the operation.
Plans for 23 March called for 1/9 to be helilifted to
the vicinity of CON THIEN (GS 1069) to influence the action of the Special
Landing Force (1/4) which had landed on the coast and was advancing inland
to the west. 3/3 was to continue its
advance north in coordination with the helolift of 1/9.
On 23 March, as
3/3 advanced north, contact with the enemy was made on several occasions
resulting in 1 NVA KIA (Conf) and 11 KIA (Prob). The enemy broke contact to
the north. 3/3 set up nighttime positions in the vicinity of (YD 108658).
On the afternoon of 23 March, it was decided to alter the scheme of
maneuver and move 1/9 to the eastern flank of 3/3 by vehicle along Route
76. Both units were to move north abreast on the 24th, with (YD
69) gridline as the eventual limit of advance. In addition F/2/12,
which had been supporting the operation from CAM LO
was to displace north to a forward artillery position at (YD 143616), with
security being provided by a provisional company formed from the 3d Marines
and HQ 12 Marines. The scheme of maneuver was still concerned with the
influencing the action of the SLF.
1/9 commenced movement by vehicle at 231553H to the
forward artillery position at which the unit dismounted and proceeded north
along Route 76 by foot. 1/9 set up nighttime positions at (YD 147625) with
one company to the north. 3/3 set up
nighttime positions in the vicinity of (YD 108658). G/2/26 continued
its company sized patrol in the valley south of MUTTER Ridge (vicinity XD
995584). At 240815H, 1/9 commenced movement north. During the morning and
afternoon the battalion engaged in heavy fire fights with enemy troops in
well entrenched positions at several locations. The action took place in
the vicinity of PHU AN (YD 134673). Results of the day’s contact by 1/9
were 7 friendly KIA and 57 WIA; with 23 KIA (conf) and 43 KIA (prob)
inflicted on the enemy. 1/9 set up nighttime positions to the south of PHU AN at (YD 142658).
At 240830H, 3/3
commenced movement north. At 0930 3/3 located 8 enemy graves. Results: 8 enemy KIA (conf).
At 0945H the command group and L/3/3 came under mortar attack,
receiving approximately 33 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The attack was
suppressed after counter mortar fire was delivered. Friendly casualties
sustained were 3 KIA and 17 WIA. During the afternoon, at 1630 L/3/3 (YD
111679) also came in contact with the enemy in entrenched positions in the
hamlets of TAN HOA and AN HOA and employed small arms and 60mm mortars. The
enemy, however, broke contact on each occasion. At 1740H I/3/3 made contact
with estimated 30-40 enemy at (YD 134674). Results
of action 28 enemy KIA (conf) and 15 enemy KIA (prob)Total
friendly casualties sustained by 3/3 were 7 KIA and 25 WIA; casualties
inflicted on the enemy were 37 KIA (conf) and 17 KIA (prob). 3/3 set up
nighttime positions in the vicinity of (YD 114676).
G/2/26 returned to its battalion position south of THON
SON LAM on 24 March.
On 25 March, 3/3
continued the attack in the vicinity of TAM HOA and AN HOA Hamlets (YD
115675). The battalion encountered resistance throughout the day, including
five separate mortar attacks. By the end of the day the battalion had
approached the limit of advance and set up nighttime positions at (YD
113686) with elements remaining to the south to continue operating in that
area.
During 25 March, 1/9 continued its attack on PHU AN.
Moving up flame and gun tanks in the morning, the battalion assaulted
through the village in the afternoon after thorough preparation fires by
supporting arms. Only rear guard action was encountered; however 10
additional enemy bodies were discovered, a PW (NVA) was taken, and numerous
items of equipment were captured. 1/9 again withdrew to the south to set up
nighttime positions with companies outposted north of the hamlet.
On 26 March, 3/3
moved northwest from positions on the preceding day to the vicinity of (YD
124689) where nighttime positions were set up. Just prior to midnight the
battalion came under two mortar attacks receiving an aggregate total of 218
82mm mortar rounds. Marine casualties were 1 KIA and 6 WIA. 1/9 moved
northwest on 26 March, setting up nighttime positions in PHU AN with companies outposted at (YD 143696) and (YD
148693). The battalion had only minor contact on 26 March.
On 27 March, 3/3
proceeded north of CON THIEN to operate in that area. 1/9 drew back to
the south of PHU AN in preparation for withdrawing on the following day.
Plans for 28 March were to terminate the operation by moving the two
battalions south to the forward artillery position at (YD 143616) for pick
up by truck.
At 280910H, 1/9 arrived at the pickup point; at 1100H
the battalion arrived at Camp CARROLL to relieve 3/9. By 1300H all 3/3 units arrived at the pickup point and commenced
motor march to the THON SON LAM position, arriving there at 1545H
terminating the operation. Friendly casualties for the operation were
28 KIA and 176 WIA. Enemy casualties were 93 KIA (conf), 71 KIA (prob), 2 PW (NVA), in addition to numerous items of captured
equipment.
At 260800H, the 3d Marines assumed operational control
of Operation BEACON HILL being conducted by 1/4. The BLT had landed on the
coast and moved inland to positions west of GIO LINH and Route1. For the
purpose of coordination of the battalions operating in this area, 3d
Marines was in the best position to control 1/4 effectively. On 26 March,
1/4 continued west with the lead elements reaching (YD 117722); the command
group remained in the vicinity of GIO LINH for the night. During the day’s
activities, the lead company made contact with the enemy during the
afternoon, and in the evening a medevac chopper was shot down trying to
evacuate the wounded from the day’s contact.
On 27 March, 1/4 continued to operate in the vicinity of
the previous day’s activity completing the seizure of Objective A and 4. On
28 March the battalion pulled back to the vicinity of GIO LINH. On 29
March, 1/4 detached B/1/4 to provide security for G/2/12 which had set up a
forward artillery position between GIO LINH and DONG HA on Route 1. A/1/4
conducted a combined sweep with ARVN forces along the coast. The remaining
two companies operated in the vicinity of GIO LINH. On 31 March, 1/4 was
alerted for a helolift to the vicinity of CON THIEN to set up a blocking
position for 3d Marines forces operating to the south. The command group
and Companies A, C, and D were lifted into the area on the afternoon of 31
March and set up blocking positions along the road just south of the
gridline to the south of CON THIEN. Total friendly casualties for Operation
BEACON HILL to 312400H were 33 KIA and 241 WIA. Casualties inflicted upon
the enemy were 351 KIA (conf), 651 (prob), 1 PW (VC) and 1 PW (NVA).
However, most of the contact occurred prior to the 3d Marines assumption of
operational control at 260800H.
On 28 March, as
1/9 and 3/3 came out of the field, plans had been made to replace them in
the field with 3/9. The battalion was to be relieved of responsibility
for the defense of Camp CARROLL by 1/9 and move into the operating area by
motor march. The area was bounded on the north by the road south of grid
line 69, on the east by the road in the vicinity of grid line 13, and on
the west by grid line 08. 3/4 was to be operating to the east under the
operational control of Division Forward, and 1/4 was to operate to the
north continuing with Operation BEACON HILL. 3/9’s activities were to
consist primarily of night ambushes.
At 280900H, E/2/26 chopped to 3/9 to participate in the
operation. By 1835H, the command group, I and M/3/9, and e/2/26 had arrived
in the operating area. The battalion set up nighttime ambush positions in
the vicinity of (YD 101630).
E/2/26 moved to nighttime positions at (YD 138615) in
preparation for movement to the 2/26 command post at THON SON LAM on the
following day. 2/26 was to depart for DA NANG on 30 March. At 301005H,
E/2/26 departed for THON SON LAM by motor march and chopped to 2/26 at
1040H. At 301430H, the lead elements of 2/26 departed for DONG HA and the
battalion chopped to 3dMarDiv(Fwd). On 30 March,
3/9 moved north in preparation for night ambush positions. On the afternoon
of 30 March, M/3/9 made contact with an enemy unit of undetermined size.
The enemy broke contact, fleeing east; while in pursuit, M/3/9 succeeded in
killing 4 enemy (conf). At 301800H, I/3/9 reported
receiving mortar fire in the vicinity of (YD 104654). In the resulting
action, the enemy walked mortars across the I/3/9 command group and second
platoon, then assaulted twice, succeeding in overrunning the position on
the second attempt. The first and third platoons, upon learning of the
action, moved to assist the remainder of the company and were ambushed by
the enemy from a hasty ambush position as they moved into the area. With
the arrival of UH1E gunships, the company succeeded in driving off the
enemy. Total friendly casualties for the incident were 15 KIA, including
the company commander, the executive officer and the battalion air officer,
and 47 WIA. Reported enemy casualties were 41 KIA (conf) and 35 KIA (prob);
however additional bodies were found in the battle area for several days
thereafter.
As a result of the fierceness of this encounter, 3/4
(command group and K and L/3/4) operating to the west was chopped to 3d
Marines, to be moved west to assist 3/9 if necessary. In addition, L/3/3 was designated to join 3/9 and moved by convoy
from 3/3 position at THON SON LAM into the operating area, arriving in the
vicinity of (YD 141631) at 3010050H. L/3/3 chopped to 3/9 at 310200H. L/3/3
was to link up with 3/9 the following morning.
The scheme of maneuver for 31 March was for 3/4 to
sweep THON BAI AN (YD 119669) to the north of the battle area. 3/9 was to
search out the battle area, and to the northwest. 1/4, conducting Operation
BEACON HILL, was to be lifted to CON THIEN to set up blocking positions on
the road south of the 69 grid line.
Units proceeded with their assigned missions on 31
March. 3/9 set up nighttime positions in the vicinity of (YD 118668). 1/4
completed its helilift and moved into its assigned blocking positions for
the night. As March ended, the operation was still continuing. Enemy
casualties for the 3/9 operation up to the end of March were 53 KIA (conf),
41 KIA (prob), and 2 PW (NVA).
Total enemy casualties during March for Operation
PRAIRIE II and III were: 503 KIA (conf), 239 KIA (prob), 15 PW (NVA), 1 PW
(VC). Total friendly casualties for March for Operation PRAIRIE II and III
were: 94 KIA, 398 WIA (USMC), 7 WIA (USA).
In the field of logistics, three major operations
occurred during March. From 1-3 March 2/3 was relieved by 3/9. In addition
to the movement of men and supplies, this transfer of responsibility
included the orderly and efficient exchange of Class II encampment and
garrison items and Class I and V items on hand. Secondly, during March, 11th
Engineers completed work on the section of Route 9 between CA LU and KHE
SANH. This effort represented the largest single activity undertaken by the
engineers within the 3d Marines area of operations and required security
support of two platoons from CA LU Outpost. As a result of the completion
and opening of Route 9 to KHE SANH, a ROUGH RIDER carrying supplies and
equipment was rundown Route 9 to KHE SANH. 3d Marines controlled the convoy
during the period it was within the area of operations. In addition these
three logistics efforts, 3d Marines conducted 21 vehicular tactical troop
movements, transporting troops to and from battle areas.
Major efforts at Camp CARROLL as a result of the mortar
attack on 6-7 March were made to fortify with bunker material or sandbags
the entire cantonment area. Five COC bunkers were delivered to major unit
commands within the camp, after they had been on order since October 1966.
Fighting holes, which did not possess overhead cover, were provided such
cover. Protective holes within all living areas were completed, and the
damage suffered from the mortar attack was repaired primarily by second
echelon maintenance.
The Civil Affairs program within the area of operations
continued in an orderly fashion, somewhat limited by the heavy operational
commitments of the infantry units. A CAC unit formed from 3d Marines assets
has undertaken an active patrolling role in the CUA Valley area in an
effort to become acquainted with the people with which and the area in
which the CAC unit will be operating. At the end of March a major
assistance effort was undertaken in the CUA Valley to aid the people of CAM
NHGIA whose village had been ravaged by fire. Food, clothing and building
materials were afforded the people as part of the assistance program.
Psychological Operations during March primarily
emphasized the aircraft drop method of distributing propaganda leaflets
both to the enemy and civilian population. In addition, portable speakers were
employed to broadcast messages to the enemy during operations in attempts
to bring in Ralliers. Broadcasts were also made to the civilian population
in CAM LO and CUA Valley emphasizing support for the government.
As the month drew to a close, operations north of CAM
LO continued to require the maximum emphasis and effort from the 3d
Marines. Other programs will remain secondary until this effort is resolved
or stabilized.
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